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Political Incentives and State Subsidy Allocation: 
Evidence from Hungarian Municipalities 
Balázs Muraközy – Álmos Telegdy 
 
Abstract 
 
Using application-level data on successful and rejected applications for the European Union’s 
Structural and Cohesion Funds between 2004 and 2012 in Hungary, we study which grant 
types are susceptible to political manipulation and how politicians achieve this goal.  Using 
township fixed-effect estimators to attenuate the simultaneity bias between municipality 
characteristics and political affiliation, we find that townships with a mayor endorsed by the 
governing parties obtain 10 percent higher grant value per capita.  This effect varies widely by 
grant attributes: it is of 16-19 percent when the applicant is a public entity or the project’s 
purpose is construction so it is visible to voters and thus may bring about electoral benefits.  
For private applications and non-construction grants, where electoral gains are likely to be 
limited, the estimated effect is zero.  Decomposing the township alignment effect into grant 
application effects (application intensity and the average value of grant) and grant decision 
effects (grant success rate and proportion of grant value received) reveals that both margins 
play a role in the political manipulation of grant distribution.  When analyzing the effect of 
grants on votes, we show that voters indeed reward construction and public projects. 
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Hungary 
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Politikai ösztönzők és az állami támogatások allokációja: 
A magyar EU-támogatások települések közötti 
elosztásának elemzése 
 
Muraközy Balázs – Telegdy Álmos 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Az Európai Unió Strukturális és Kohéziós alapjaiból folyósított magyarországi támogatásokat 
igénylő, 2004 és 2012 között nyertes és nem nyertes pályázatok adatait tartalmazó adatbázis 
segítségével azt vizsgáljuk, hogy milyen típusú pályázatok esetében volt a legvalószínűbb a 
politikai szempontokat is figyelembe vevő döntés, és milyen módon befolyásolhatták a 
döntéseket a politikusok. Településszintű fix hatásokat használunk a becslésben a kihagyott 
változók kezelésére, és azt találjuk, hogy a kormánypártok által támogatott polgármesterek 
által vezetett városok lakosonként körülbelül 10 százalékkal több támogatáshoz jutottak. Ez a 
hatás nagyban különbözik a megvalósított projektek jellemzői szerint: 16–19 százalék a 
lakosonkénti többlet, ha a pályázó a közszférához tartozik vagy a projektben építkezésre kerül 
sor, az ilyen pályázatok könnyebben megfigyelhetők a választók számára. Nulla hatást 
becsülünk magánszférában működő pályázók és építkezést nem tartalmazó projektek 
esetében, amelyeknél a politikai haszon feltehetőleg kisebb. Ezeknek a hatásoknak a 
felbontása pályázási hatásra (a pályázatok száma és nagysága) és döntéshozatali hatásra (a 
nyertes pályázatok aránya, valamint a megnyert és pályázott összeg aránya) arra utal, hogy 
mindkét tényező fontos szerepet játszik a források elosztásának politikai befolyásolásában. 
Amikor a források későbbi szavazatokra gyakorolt hatását vizsgáljuk, akkor kimutatható, 
hogy az építkezést tartalmazó és a közszférának juttatott támogatások valóban növelik a 
polgármesterre leadott szavazatok számát. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: redisztribúciós politika, kormánypárti és ellenzéki települések, Strukturális 
és Kohéziós alapok, Magyarország 
 
JEL kódok: D72, D78, H77 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many countries and regions allocate substantial sums for regional subsidies in order to 
achieve convergence and accelerate economic growth. Among the largest of such schemes are 
the European Union (EU) Cohesion and Structural Funds, which spent EUR 348 billion 
between 2007 and 2013 to assist its less developed regions in achieving convergence, but the 
success of these efforts greatly depends on the efficient distribution of these funds.1  This 
paper aims at quantifying the effect of political manipulation of these funds in one new 
member state, Hungary.2  The sheer size of these transfers (amounting to 3.2 percent of 
Hungarian GDP between 2004 and 2012, the period we study), the fiscal constraints 
experienced by the government and the relatively immature political institutions make these 
funds especially exposed to political manipulation and, consequently, misallocation (the 
grants were allocated by institutions led by senior politicians).3    We use a comprehensive, 
application-level dataset having information on about 140,000 successful and rejected grant 
applications – ranging from large road construction through education of doctors to small 
firm-level subsidies - for this analysis. 
The regional allocation of public funds has generated a great deal of attention in academic 
research.  The literature of fiscal federalism suggests that such transfers are prone to 
delivering private benefits to the ruling government, as they often maximize their chances of 
re-election instead of social welfare (e.g., Weingast et al., 1981).  More recently, theoretical 
papers focused on transfers between politically aligned (i.e., controlled by the same party) 
central and local governments (e.g., Arulampalam et al., 2009) and many papers examined 
this question empirically as we detail below.  If extra funds generate goodwill for the 
incumbent politicians among voters, who cannot distinguish between the activities of 
governments at various levels, vote maximizing will dictate larger funds flying to politically 
aligned districts as otherwise the opposition can reap part of the political benefits.  Previous 
research has also analyzed the effects of the reputation of local politicians (Golden and Picci, 
2008), the severity of the political competition at the local level (Arulampalam, 2009; Case, 
2001; Coats, 2006; Costa-I-Font et al., 2003; Lacrinese et al., 2006; Leigh, 2008; Levitt and 
                                                        
1 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/structural_cohesion_fund_en.htm 
2 The analysis, however, may also be relevant for the whole region: the 10 countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe accessing the EU in 2004 and 2006 are rather similar in their grade of development and institutional 
structure (EBRD, 2012).  If these determine (at least partially) the distribution of funds, the findings of this 
study may apply to all of them. 
3  Anecdotal evidence for such manipulation abounds.  Politicians frequently state that fund transfers depend on 
election results.  For example, János Veres, the minister of finance of the ruling left-wing coalition, made the 
following comment during the electoral campaign in 2006: “The next four years will bring about lots of 
development projects and achievements for the county…The regional distribution of funds within the country 
will depend on the election results” (Index Online News Website, 18.04.2006).  András Tállai (secretary of 
state of the right-wing coalition) also stated that “…the amount of funds flying to a county…will depend in 
great deal on who will lead the county” (Népszava daily newspaper, 07.10.2014). 
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Poterba, 1999), the effect of multiple upper-tier grantor governments (Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro), the variation of grant allocation across the political cycle (Veiga and 
Veiga, 2013) the effects of the transfers on re-election probabilities (Veiga and Veiga, 2013; 
Leigh, 2008; Healy and Malhotra, 2009) and the trade-off between efficiency and political 
factors (Cadot et al., 2006; Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
Our analysis builds on this line of research but it also extends it in three directions.  First, 
it analyzes a new EU member state, where the combination of relatively new democratic 
institutions and the magnitude of transfers makes such analysis especially relevant (we are 
not aware any papers studying this region).  We also analyze the relation between political 
favoritism and grant characteristics: the identity of the applicant (public organization or 
private entity) and project visibility (which we proxy by construction and public 
transportation projects).4  Finally, we examine the ways politicians achieve the partisan 
distribution of funds: is partisan decision-making the main source of extra funds received by 
aligned townships or already the volume of applications and the sums requested are biased 
towards favoring the governing party’s municipalities? 
The variation of favoritism by political alignment, project visibility and applicant type can 
be motivated in the following way.  Each grant application is associated with some social 
utility on the one hand, and an expected private gain of the ruling party on the other – an 
increase in the chances of re-election.  The utility function of politicians is a combination of 
the public and private gain minus the cost of reallocating funds from projects with high social 
value to projects with high private value.5  If the private gain plays a role in the distribution of 
funds (and it is not correlated perfectly with public benefits), it will result in misallocation 
from the social point of view as projects with a large private benefit will crowd out some 
projects with high social value.  In the following, we argue that such misallocation differs by 
the type of the project and the type of the applicant. 
The private political gain may depend on the visibility of the project: even if a project is 
value enhancing over the long run, it may not yield electoral gains on the next election if it is 
only observable for few voters.  Electoral gains may also depend on the identity of the 
applicant: if it is the local administration, rather than a private actor, politicians may more 
easily claim credit for it.  The probability of re-election is also larger if the government places 
funds to districts where the local administration is politically aligned with the central 
government as they can easily attribute all the political value to themselves.  If the opposition 
                                                        
4 Most studies do not distinguish between grant-types or they analyze only one type.  Exceptions are Golden and 
Picci (2008), who distinguish between infrastructure expenditures and road/airport construction, and Healy 
and Malhotra (2009) between disaster relief and prevention.  Our approach is closest to Leigh (2008), who 
distinguish between four projects comprising constructions and other, less visible activities.  We know no 
papers studying differences by applicant type. 
5 One may assume that institutions were set up in order to facilitate the efficient distribution of funds. In order 
to convince bureaucrats working in these institutions to favor some projects, the politicians may have to 
sacrifice time, political capital or even risk detection. 
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rules the local administration, it can reap some of these benefits.  As a result, this simple 
framework predicts that politicians will implement a number of socially less beneficial visible 
projects administered by public entities in aligned townships.6 
An alternative hypothesis is that the ease of the execution of corruption payments affects 
the distribution of grants.7  Corruption effectively materializes in grant-related procurement 
contracts (e.g., Goldman et al., 2013; Mironov and Zhuravskaya, 2014), and it probably can 
happen more easily if the contracting entities are from the same political body.  This 
hypothesis predicts that politically aligned municipalities get more grants than those in 
opposition, at least if the contractor is a public entity.  For private contracts, however, the 
political connection of the firm should matter rather than the relation between the central 
and local administrations.  Although the construction business – which is highly correlated 
with the visibility of projects – is among the most corrupted industries (Hardoon and 
Heinrich, 2011), it is again likely that firm connections matter rather than the political 
alignment of the township.  In our analysis, we follow the literature and hypothesize that 
political, rather than material gains drive the distribution of funds but corruption arguments 
may also play a role, especially for public applications. 
We test these predictions by running regressions for different types of applications: when 
the applicant is a public or private entity and when the outcome of the application is visible or 
not (where we proxy visibility by whether the project involves construction).  To do this, we 
aggregate up each class of project to the municipality level and use it as the dependent 
variable in the regression analysis. 
Our comprehensive data on successful and rejected applications allow studying the ways 
politicians reallocate funds.  We identify four margins (and use them as dependent variables 
in the regression analysis): the ratio of the number of applications to the population, the 
average amount applied for, the success rate, and the ratio of the funds allocated and applied 
for.  The first two margins affect redistribution through the application process while the last 
two through the decision-making process. 
Our main explanatory variable, the political alignment dummy, shows whether the 
governing parties endorsed the mayor on the election.  The coefficient of this variable shows 
the advantage aligned municipalities enjoy relative to similar municipalities led by opposition 
mayors. 
                                                        
6 In our data the correlation coefficient between log(public) and log(visible) grant values is 0.73.  Unfortunately, 
our estimation strategy cannot disentangle the two effects and we treat them as two proxies for political 
benefits of grant distribution. 
7 According to Transparency International (2014), Hungary is in the highest third of the EU in terms of 
corruption, with scores similar to the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia, but lower, than Romania, 
Bulgaria and Greece. 
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The econometric identification of the relation between political alignment and regional 
fund distribution is challenged by the potential endogeneity resulting from omitted variables 
at the township level reflecting level of development, urbanization, remoteness, the presence 
of important public institutions and other important municipality characteristics.  The 
amount of funds received by a municipality may depend on such regional variables, because 
richer regions may have projects that are more viable while poorer regions may have priority 
in regional policy.  Parties with various programs may also have their voting base vary with 
regional development or level of urbanization.  If this is the case, the estimated effect between 
political affiliation and the distribution of funds may be spurious.  To mitigate this bias, we 
first control for these omitted variables by adding controls, which account for observable 
differences between settlements.  This approach has its drawbacks, including strong 
functional form assumptions and unobserved heterogeneity.  To alleviate this bias, we also 
add township fixed effects to the regression to control for factors that are fixed in time and 
may create spurious correlation between political leadership and the propensity to winning 
grants. 
The empirical results show evidence for the role of political alignment in the distribution 
of EU funds.  We find that alignment predicts an 11.4 percent higher value of grants and this 
effect is positive only for public and construction grants, reaching 16.4 and 19.4 percent, 
respectively.  We estimate positive effects of the role of political alignment in both the 
application process and decision-making: aligned municipalities file a larger number of 
applications and have a higher chance of success.  These effects are different from zero only 
for public and construction grants: political alignment induces a higher application intensity 
by 13 and 6 percentage points, and a higher success rate of 4 and 6 percentage points, 
respectively.8  The change in application intensity of aligned municipalities suggests that the 
stringent regulation and scrutiny of the decision-making process places a part of political 
manipulation to an earlier stage of the allocation process.  For example, the central 
government may inform the local party members how to apply or they create programs with 
short deadlines so uninformed parties cannot apply. 
We also estimate the effect of grants on the probability of re-election of incumbent 
mayors, and we find positive and precisely estimated effects of 4-5 percentage points when 
total grants received by a township increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the 
distribution of all grants received by a township.  More important is for the analysis that we 
estimate positive effects only for public and construction grants, the types identified to be 
distributed politically. 
                                                        
8 Aligned townships also apply for construction grants that are larger by 17 percent than those filed by the 
opposition, but this effect is statistically not significant.  
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The structure of the paper is the following. The next section describes the political parties 
and the institutions of fund distribution.  Section 3 discusses the data and descriptive 
statistics, followed by the methodology and the results while the last section concludes. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONS OF FUND DISTRIBUTION AND THE HUNGARIAN 
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
2.1 INSTITUTIONS OF FUND DISTRIBUTION 
The purpose of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds is to foster the convergence of poorer 
regions within the European Union.  Although all member states contribute to these funds, 
they represent significant transfer of resources from richer to poorer countries.  The 
magnitude of the funds is negotiated for seven-year planning cycles and our data include 
grants from the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 cycles.  At the beginning of the cycle, countries 
set up new programs and institutions, hence payments are relatively small in the beginning of 
the period and much larger near its end.  Large projects involve even more preparation and 
time-consuming public procurement, so payments for these are quite concentrated near the 
end of the planning period. 
EU regulations prescribe a set of institutional guarantees both regarding the distribution 
of funds and the control of the process (Council Regulation No. 1083/2006), and the 
Commission periodically monitors whether the national institutions are in line with the 
general rules and whether they apply the procedures appropriately.  It also monitors selected 
individual projects.  As a result, national governments have to comply with a rather large 
number of formal rules and procedures regarding the distribution of EU funds (Nagy and 
Heil, 2013).  Most importantly, the funds should be allocated based on pre-determined 
criteria and procedures announced in the calls for different subprograms.  
These criteria differ across different types of projects. Small projects have an automated 
process, based on whether the application satisfies the requirements of eligibility (like the 
size of the company).  In such a case, allocation often follows a first-come first-served rule 
across applicants, which suit the eligibility criteria.  The evaluation of large or of so-called 
“strategic” projects is based, however, on less transparent criteria, such as the suitability of 
the business plan or they have to comply with the government’s sector-specific or regional 
strategy.  Such evaluations often include many subjective elements. 
The rigid institutional setting suggests that the EU forces national governments to 
observe some formal rules during the evaluation process itself, hence there is a limited space 
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for manipulation in the decision-making process.  It is important, therefore, to study the 
application process as well, which we do below. 
 
2.2 THE HUNGARIAN POLITICAL PARTY STRUCTURE AND ELECTION OUTCOMES 
Our variable of interest is the political affiliation of mayors (as we detail below).  Mayors are 
elected with a simple voting process requiring a relative majority of votes, which contrasts 
with the election process of municipal council members (this being more complex and 
heterogeneous across different municipality types).  The alternative measure – parliamentary 
election districts – do not perfectly overlap with townships as sometimes there are multiple 
election districts in large townships while multiple small municipalities may constitute a 
district.9 
The party structure of Hungary is such that it is quite straightforward to classify mayors 
as left or right wing and there was no grand coalition between the two sides.  The Hungarian 
Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats are on the left side of the political 
spectrum while the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum on the right (the leftist and conservative parties usually governed in coalition).10  The 
first election studied in this paper was held in May 2006 and did not change the left-wing 
government coalition.  The local elections (held in the same year in October), however, 
strengthened the opposition who won many seats in local councils and gave the mayor for a 
large number of townships as well.  In May 2010, the government was overthrown and local 
elections brought a sweeping right-wing victory as well. These changes provide the variation 
for our fixed effects specification. 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The host of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds Database is the Hungarian National 
Development Agency.  The data are available from 2004 – Hungary’s accession to the EU – 
until August 2012.  The basic unit of observation is an application and the data provide 
information on both the successful and unsuccessful applications.  To organize the 
application process, the Hungarian government created subprograms, which set the target 
activity of the EU funds.  The number of subprograms is 1,621 (but in 184 there was no 
                                                        
9 As a robustness check, we use the political composition of the City Council to group townships by political 
affiliation.  The procedures of the computation of this variable are available upon request. 
10 Two parties, which participated only in the election in 2010, the far right Jobbik (with 3 mayors) and the left 
wing Politics Can be Different (with 1 mayor) are coded as independent as they were not part of the 
government. 
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winner application) and they cover a very large variety of activities.  Examples include 
training programs for teachers and doctors, logistical upgrading of public services, subsidies 
for small and medium sized enterprises, investments to attract tourism, building and 
upgrading the transport infrastructure and sewerage, renovation and remodeling of schools, 
hospitals or towns’ main squares.  The following variables are available for each application: 
the name of the subprogram (which we use to convey information on the activity applied for), 
the identity of the applicant (company, public entity, nonprofit private organization, natural 
person), the amount of money applied for, the date of decision-making, whether the 
application was successful, the funds granted in case of success and the date of transfer. 
The political data come from the National Election Committee, and they provide 
information on each election outcome at the township level.  We identify each mayor’s 
political affiliation, and code it as left or right wing.  If the mayor was once associated with a 
party, we keep this political affiliation for the whole period even if the mayor became 
independent in another political cycle.  We also checked the political affiliation of formally 
independent mayors as they can be officially endorsed by parties.  To do this, we searched the 
internet for each independent mayor of a settlement larger than 4,000.  When we found that 
the mayor was associated with a party, we coded it accordingly.   These two procedures 
resulted in adding the political affiliation for 2,132 township-years (the first procedure being 
responsible for most changes).11 
The municipality variables come from the T-Star Database (hosted by the Hungarian 
Statistical Office) which provides settlement-level indicators.  We use the population and 
population density, the registered unemployment rate (defined as the number of registered 
unemployed relative to the population aged 18-59)12 and the tax revenues of the local 
authority (which consist mainly of company taxes and therefore correlates strongly with 
economic activity).  The monetary variables throughout are expressed in HUF 2012, deflated 
by the consumer price index. 
We drop the capital city from the data because its peculiar local administration system 
does not allow its classification along the left-right axis.13  We also exclude settlements with 
independent mayors (these are usually, but not exclusively, small places).  As Table 1 shows, 
aligned townships were almost identical in numbers during in the first political cycle studied 
(219 and 239, respectively).  The next election in 2006 reinforced the central government but 
the opposition won many more seats in the local election: the government had 166 mayors 
while the opposition 429.  In the elections of 2010, the government was replaced and an 
                                                        
11 As a robustness check, we test whether these imputations affect the results.   
12 Due to lack of information at this level of disaggregation, we cannot use the standard definition of 
unemployment. 
13 Budapest has a two-tier local administration consisting of a senior mayor for the city and mayors for each 
district, who can belong to different parties. Also, many projects cross the boundaries of districts. 
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overwhelming majority of the mayors changed their political affiliation as well: the ruling 
party gave 607 while the opposition only 96. 
The table also shows several township characteristics.  In the first two political cycles, the 
government controlled larger and more densely populated settlements than the opposition, 
with higher per capita tax revenues and lower registered unemployment rates.  In the last 
political cycle, government-led settlements were somewhat larger, less densely populated, 
with lower amounts of tax revenues per capita but also lower unemployment rates.  The 
comparison of the settlements controlled by the government and opposition suggests that it 
is necessary to control for such settlement attributes in the regression analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the total amount of subsidies distributed between 2004 and 2012, 
disaggregated into the fraction covered by our sample, the share of Budapest and of 
independent settlements, which we do not use in the analysis.  The total value of funds varied 
widely across years, partly reflecting the EU and Hungarian political budget cycle and partly 
the ability of the Hungarian society to absorb grants.14  During the first 4 years of the 
analysis, the annual value of grants was between 220-450 billion annually (measured in HUF 
2012), but during the last 5 years of the analysis it went up to HUF 1029-1768 billion.  
Although a large fraction of the grants went to Budapest and independent settlements had a 
sizable share as well, the sample used in this study covers 40-62 percent of total funds each 
year with the exception of 2007 when the coverage is only 22 percent.  Most of the grants left 
out from our analysis went to Budapest; among other townships, our sample coverage is at 
least 59 percent each year. 
We group applications by the identity of the applicant and the type of the project.  An 
application is public if the applying organization is a public organization (typically the 
township’s local administration, schools, hospitals etc.).  We identify the type of the project 
based on the subprogram applied for.  ‘Visible’ or ‘construction’ projects are those which 
involve the construction or renovation of buildings, the development, upgrading or 
maintenance of infrastructure (roads, railway, etc.), the renewal of public places (squares, for 
example) and the purchase of new vehicles in public transportation.  If the subprogram does 
not belong to any of these activities, we call them “other.”  Table 2 presents the total value of 
grants in each political cycle along these groupings, and reveals that they were always close to 
even. 
Figure 3 shows the average yearly value of grants per capita, received by aligned and 
opposition municipalities for different types of grants.  To start with the total value of grants, 
opposition townships received about 20 percent less value per population than aligned ones.  
                                                        
14 Although the budget cycle can also be endogenous at the EU level (e.g., Efthyvoulou, 2012), Hungarian 
domestic politics could not affect it in a great deal and so we abstract from this mechanism. 
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The difference by grantee and grant type also suggests that aligned municipalities were 
always able to collect higher grant value. 
Our main outcome variable is the total value of grants given to a township in a given year, 
divided by its population (and we construct similar variables for public/private and 
construction/other grants).  We always consider the time of the final decision when linking 
the applications to years as that seems to be the point when political influence matters the 
most.  To analyze selection and political intervention in decision-making, we construct four 
additional dependent variables.  We describe the application process with two variables: the 
number of applications per capita in the township each year and the average sum applied for.  
To model the decision-making process, we use the ratio of winner applications to the total 
number of applications, and the ratio between the sum allocated and the sum applied for. 
The descriptive statistics of these variables are in Table 3.15  The average grant value per 
capita increased from about HUF 30 thousand in 2004-2006 to 160 thousand in 2010-2012. 
This is quite substantial, equivalent to about one month of net average salary, showing that 
these funds represented an important channel of redistribution among municipalities.  The 
number of applications per capita was 1-2 for 1000 inhabitants.  The success rate also 
remained more or less constant during the period at 50-60 percent.  The average grant value 
requested increased for successful applications while rejected applications do not have a clear 
pattern.  Finally, the ratio of grant value awarded and requested is 98 percent, showing that 
successful applications received all the funds they requested. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
We employ various dependent variables to test the effect of political partisanship while 
keeping the right hand side of the regression equation fixed.  We follow the literature and set 
the unit of observation to be municipality-year.  First we establish the relation between the 
total value of grants awarded to townships and our variable of interest, Aligned.  This 
variable takes the value of 1 if the mayor of the township is affiliated with the ruling political 
formation, and zero otherwise.  The dependent variable is the value of grants won by a 
township in a given year.  A non-trivial share of township-years have a zero value for this 
variable (especially when we disaggregate the variable by grant attributes).  As we prefer to 
log the dependent variable to interpret the estimated coefficients as proportional variation, 
we add 1 (HUF 1000 per capita) to the variable. 
                                                        
15 To save space, we present the descriptive statistics for the variables associated with the total value of grants, 
while the disaggregation by applicant and activity type are available upon request. 
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The first problem encountered in the estimation of the relationship between political 
alignment and grant value is that townships differ from each other in aspects that may 
correlate with both political orientation and size of subsidies.  For example, poorer 
municipalities may be more likely to vote for the political party promising a higher degree of 
redistribution while the government may indeed transfer higher amounts of subsidies to such 
towns, regardless of their political orientation.  To control for the grade of development, we 
include the log of local tax revenues per capita.  These come mostly from revenue-based taxes 
paid by enterprises and thus this variable serves as a proxy for the intensity of the local 
economic activity.  We also include log population density in order to account for the level of 
urbanization.  To handle differences in labor supply and labor market conditions in general, 
we control for the unemployment rate.  We also include 8 categorical variables accounting for 
the type of the settlement (village, small town etc.) as well as 7 large region (NUTS-2) 
dummies interacted with year effects to partial out any regional and time varying shocks.  
The baseline equation is the following: 
 
 
where i denotes municipalities, t denotes years and we cluster the standard errors at the 
municipality level.  When we study how political favoritism varies by application 
characteristics, we replace the dependent variable by its subsets: the total value of grants at 
the municipality level received by private and public entities and of construction and other 
grants. 
In this equation  is the marginal effect of political alignment on total grant value.  A 
positive  suggests that aligned municipalities receive a higher level of subsidies.  The 
measured effect, however, is an unbiased estimator of political favoritism only if alignment of 
the local and central governance is not correlated with settlement level unmeasured 
attributes, which are themselves correlated with the propensity of obtaining EU grants.  
Although we control for several variables, which measure the degree of urbanization and 
economic development, it is possible that we do not control for many township attributes 
enhancing or hampering municipalities from obtaining grants.  To attenuate this omitted 
variable bias, we add township fixed effects to the regression.16 
In addition to estimating the average effect of political alignment on grant value, we also 
identify channels through which politicians can direct funds to the aligned municipalities.  
                                                        
16 There are 52 left-right and 6 right-left switchers around the election in 2006.  In 2010 the number of switchers 
is 354 (these are those townships which were, and remained right-wing, so when the central government 
changed, they became politically aligned).  
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We do this by disaggregating grant value per capita into four parts.  Consider the following 
equality (aggregated at the municipality level): 
 
Total grant value per capita depends on four factors: the number of applications per 
capita, the ratio of successful applications, the average value of grant applied for, and the 
ratio between the grant value and the value applied for.17  The first and the third term 
describe the application process while the second and the fourth show the effects of the 
decision-making process on final grant value.  We test the effects of these factors by using 
them as dependent variables in the main specification. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 PARTISANSHIP IN EU GRANT DISTRIBUTION 
The OLS estimates are presented in the top panel of Table 4.  Despite the stated goal of the 
European Commission that grants should decrease regional differences in development, the 
results in Table 4 suggest that Hungary did not meet this goal (as well as elsewhere, as 
Bouvet and Dall’erba (2010) find).  The estimated effects of population density and 
unemployment rate are insignificant, while tax revenues per capita positively correlated with 
the value of grant per capita.  This suggests that the Hungarian cohesion policy is more likely 
to help municipalities that are more prosperous and its role in within-country economic 
convergence is limited. 
Column 1 of the table shows the results when the dependent variable is the total value of 
grants received by townships over population.  The estimated coefficient of the variable 
Aligned represents the proportional difference in grant value per capita received by 
municipalities led by a mayor affiliated with the governing parties, relative to townships led 
by mayors of the opposition.  We find only weak evidence that politically aligned townships 
receive larger grant value: although the effect is positive and as large as 9 log points, it is 
indifferent from zero in statistical terms.  Columns 2 and 3 distinguish between public and 
private applicants (and so the dependent variable is the total value of grants received each 
year by public and private applicants per capita, respectively).  While the coefficient of 
interest for private applicants is very small and statistically not significant, the effect of 
                                                        
17 Note that the equality is satisfied only for municipalities with at least one successful grant (or else the 
denominator equals zero).  In the regression analysis below we will always use the maximum feasible set (for 
the first term the whole population, for the second the municipalities which at least one application, while for 
the last two the municipalities with at least one successful application).  To ease interpretation, we log total 
grant value per capita and the average grant value requested (the other variables are proportions). 
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Aligned is very precisely estimated for public applicants and it is as large as 0.154.  This 
finding is in line with our first hypothesis: the government allocates larger grant value to 
settlements with the same political orientation if the projects are for public entities. 
Columns 4 and 5 distinguish between construction projects and all other grants.  The 
political orientation of the municipality only matters for construction projects: the effect is 
16.7 percent, which is in sharp contrast with the insignificant and small coefficient associated 
with other projects.  This finding is in line with our second hypothesis: political affiliation 
matters when the projects are visible. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows the results of our preferred specification where we 
control for township fixed effects.  The results are quite similar to the OLS estimates although 
here we identify the alignment effect based on switching of townships between aligned and 
not aligned status.  In this specification, we estimate an effect on all grants of 11.4 percent 
(which is statistically significant at the 10-percent level).  As the total value of funds was 
about 3 percent of the GDP (as we documented above), the grant value altered to aligned 
municipalities was 0.34 percent of the GDP each year, a rather sizable reallocation of wealth 
in the economy.  Public grants are associated with an effect of 16.4 percent and construction 
grants with an effect 19.4 percent.  The alignment effect of private and non-visible grants is 
zero, suggesting the politicians engage in clientelism only if the grants are likely to bring 
political benefits. 
The insignificant estimated effects associated with those grants that are unlikely to bring 
short-term political benefits provides indirect evidence of the reliability of our identification 
strategy: if the results were driven by the divergent grades of development of aligned and not 
aligned townships, there are no reasons to expect differences between private and public 
grant values.  We would rather expect larger value for private grants as they are more likely to 
depend on the local opportunities for investment, such as the number of firms or innovative 
ideas of managers. 
How do our results compare to other studies?  Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) 
estimate the political alignment effect to be of EUR 7-11 per capita in Spain.  In our data, the 
average value of public grants per capita is HUF 34 thousand.  Multiplying this with the 
estimated coefficient of 0.157, it results that the value difference of political clientelism for 
public projects is HUF 5600 (EUR 18.5) per capita.  In the case of visible projects, the extra 
value received by the citizens of politically aligned townships is HUF 4700 each year (EUR 
16).  The total extra grant value was HUF 7500 (EUR 25).  These results are about 1.5-2 times 
larger than those from Spain and even by much more if compared to the proportional 
difference in the average salary in the two countries, which was about 2.8 (Eurostat Earnings 
Data).  Arulampalam et al. (2009) find that in India a state that is aligned and swing, obtain 
16 percent higher transfers.  This is larger than our finding for the total value of grants but 
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very similar to what we estimate for public and construction projects.  Leigh (2008) analyzes 
four programs, one being the construction of roads while the others resulting in less visible 
outcomes.  He finds the strongest partisan allocation for road construction.  For the other 
three programs he estimates significant effects for only one, and the coefficients are much 
smaller than for road construction (the magnitudes are not comparable to our results as his 
dependent variable is value of grant per electoral seat). 
 
5.2 ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS 
We start the robustness checks with testing whether our imputations of the mayor’s political 
affiliation affects the main results.  We use as the variable of interest the uncleaned variable 
(so we do not correct it with information from the internet and do not impute the political 
affiliation of independent mayors if they once were affiliated with a party).  The results, 
presented in the first row of Table 5, suggest that these imputations are innocuous and do not 
change the results. 
In the next robustness check, we use the composition of the city council as an alternative 
measure of alignment.18  The results are qualitatively similar, but larger in magnitude than in 
our preferred specification.  In this specification, the effect of political alignment on public 
grants is 0.29 and on visible grants 0.35, twice as large as in the basic specification.   
We also run random effects Tobit regressions to account for the censoring of the 
dependent variable (i.e., the municipality-years with zero grants).  The results are also robust 
to this change in the regression method. 
The analysis above may be criticized on the grounds of not taking into account the 
decision-making method.  Some – typically smaller subprograms – are allocated with 
automatic methods while larger subprograms are more discretionary. We can distinguish 
between subprograms with automated and more discretionary decision-making process.  As 
expected, when running our regressions for these two groups, we find significant positive 
political effects only for the discretionary grants, and nothing for the automated ones.  These 
variables, however, are strongly correlated with our variables of interest: for example, almost 
all the construction projects are discretionary.  To check whether this feature of the decision-
making process drives our results, we use grants only from discretionary subprograms.  As 
the last row of Table 5 presents, the results are very similar to the main results. 
                                                        
18 Note that we have a smaller sample here because in a number of smaller municipalities the mayor has a party 
alignment while candidates for the city council are independent. The correlation between the two variables is 
0.65 for municipalities with a non-independent city council and mayor. 
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Another potential source of bias is the quality and experience of local politicians, which 
may vary by political alignment.  If aligned mayors tend to be more senior and more 
influential than those in opposition, our results may be biased.  To rule this out, we augment 
the regression with a variable measuring the tenure of the mayor (the longer the person 
served as a mayor, the more likely he/she has good connections).  The second variable 
measuring the mayor’s influence is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mayor is a member 
of parliament.  Finally, we add variables measuring the proportion of votes cast for the 
incumbent mayor to proxy the underlying quality of the politicians.  The results are in 
Appendix Table A1 and show that these variables are not correlated with grant values won by 
the township except for tenure, which has a negative effect.  The estimated effect of Aligned, 
however, does not change after the inclusion of these variables in the regression. 
 
5.3 EFFECTS OF ALIGNMENT ON APPLICATIONS AND DECISION MAKING 
Having established the effect of political alignment on grant value, we turn our attention to 
the channels used to transfer larger grants to politically aligned townships.  We run the same 
fixed-effects regressions as before, but with dependent variables taken from the 
decomposition presented in the methodology section.  The first line of Table 6 shows the 
results when the dependent variable is the number of applications per capita at the municipal 
level.  Politically aligned municipalities file 11 percent more applications relative to 
population size than townships in opposition.  We find statistically significant differences for 
the two politically important applications types: public and constructions (with estimated 
coefficients of 0.13 and 0.06, respectively). 
The second margin studied is the success rate of applications (defined as the ratio 
between the number of successful applications and all applications).  The analysis reveals 
economically meaningful and statistically significant differences again for public and 
construction applications of 4 and 6 percent, respectively.  This result may also interpreted as 
visibility being important for politicians: a larger number of grants results in larger number 
of voters benefitting and thus more support for the government (Leigh, 2008). 
The next margin is the average value of grant requested by successful applications and the 
analysis uncovers important differences for construction applications.  Although the 
coefficient is not statistically significant, it is as large as 17 percent.19  Finally, we find no 
alignment effect on the ratio of the value of grant awarded and value requested. 
                                                        
19 The p-value associated with the coefficient is 0.13.  When we use the alignment of the city council as the 
variable of interest, the effect is similar in magnitude but it becomes statistically significant. 
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The large – albeit insignificant – effect of alignment on grant value can have two 
interpretations: aligned townships apply for larger grants or the government selects the large 
grants if the township is aligned.  The estimated effects of Aligned for the sample of 
unsuccessful applications (presented in Appendix Table A2) are very similar to those 
obtained on successful applications, supporting the hypothesis that aligned townships 
generally file larger grants and it is not the government what selects the large aligned grants 
during the decision making process. 
Our results therefore suggest that while the government favors its own districts in the 
decision-making process, it is at least as important for the distribution of grants that 
applications are very different between aligned and opposition townships: both the 
application intensity and the value of applications are larger for the earlier.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests two mechanisms that affect the application process.  First, the government 
can make calls for applications with specific requirements and tight deadlines, so informed 
townships can easily apply and eventually win.  Second, it seems to be common knowledge 
that local administrations that are in opposition can win only small amounts of money and 
thus they apply for smaller grants. 
Another mechanism that can foster the partisan distribution of grants is the manipulation 
of co-payments, which may be substantial: in our sample, the average value of co-payments is 
33% of the total cost of the project.  If aligned municipalities are allowed to have smaller 
share of co-payment, or the government helps them to obtain the necessary funds, they can 
also apply for larger grant value.  To test whether the share of co-payment in the total cost of 
projects varies by political alignment, we run our regression with the dependent variable 
being the total value of co-payments divided by the total value of grants received.  We find 
very small effects which are statistically significant only for private and public grants with 
magnitudes (standard errors) of 0.015 (0.007) and -0.017 (0.004).  These results, therefore, 
do not support the hypothesis that the government manipulates the share of co-payments, at 
least not to a large extent. 
 
6. THE EFFECT OF GRANT DISTRIBUTION ON VOTING OUTCOMES 
Having established the effect of political partisanship on the distribution of funds, in this 
section we analyze whether funds indeed have an effect on election outcomes.  We focus on 
incumbent mayors’ and our estimation equation is the following: 
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where i indexes townships and t indexes political cycles. The dependent variable is the 
change in the share of votes cast for the mayor between the current and preceding election 
(we differentiate the dependent variable to get rid of time-invariant mayor effects).   
equals the votes for the mayor in the preceding election, which is included to control for 
additional unobserved heterogeneity and regression to the mean.  Our variable of interest is 
, the total value of EU grants paid to municipality i during the 
political cycle (in contrast to our main regressions, here we consider the sums paid rather 
than awarded, assuming that voters can only observe ongoing projects, but using the sum 
awarded does not change the results qualitatively).   includes the same controls as in our 
main specification.  Finally, we control for party affiliation and year interactions.  Note that 
we only include municipalities where the mayor elected in t-4 also participated in the election 
in year t.20 
The results, presented in Table 7, are in line with the hypothesis that local politicians can 
benefit from public and construction grants.  The first column shows the effect of total grants 
on mayoral votes: doubling EU grants yields a 0.7 percentage point increase in the votes for 
the incumbent major.  The effect is 1.2 percentage points for public and visible grants while 
we measure no effect for the other two types.21   
How large is this effect?  Multiplying the alignment effect on total grant value (estimated 
to be of 0.114) with the coefficient of 0.007, results that the aligned incumbent mayor 
receiving the average value of extra grants received only 0.08 percentage points more votes 
than its competitor.  It is likely, however, that the partisan distribution of grants, especially in 
constructions, is lumpy: some townships get a lot while others get nothing.  At the 75th 
percentile, the log grant value is 5.18, which results in an increase of the votes by 3.6 
percentage points.  In the case of public grants, the effect at the 75th percentile is over 5 
percentage points and for construction grants it is 4 percentage points, which is large enough 
to turn around an election.22 This suggests that the distribution of EU funds provides an 
important opportunity for politicians to influence close elections that may lead to serious 
inefficiencies in the allocation of these funds. 
 
                                                        
20 As well as before, we drop townships with independent mayors, though the results are very similar if they are 
included in the analysis. 
21 One possible concern with this strategy is that grants can also serve as a proxy for the performance of the 
mayor in the given electoral cycle (even though we first difference the equation). While this is possible, the 
heterogeneous effect of different types of grants suggests that we are – at least partially – measuring the effect 
of the grants on votes cast on the mayor. 
22 Veiga and Veiga (2013) find that a one standard deviation increase in the growth of grant value per capita 
increase the vote share by almost half percentage points.  Leigh estimates that the same one standard 
deviation increase boosts votes by 2.4 percentage points.  Finally, Healy and Malhotra (2009) estimate the 
effect of disaster relief spending on election results and find that increasing it from USD 1 per capita to USD 10 
results in an increase of votes for the incumbent party by 0.77 percentage points.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzed the partisan distribution of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in a 
new EU member state, Hungary.  Using universal application-level data for the first 9 years 
of EU accession of Hungary and controlling for township fixed effects to account for the 
heterogeneity of townships characteristics, we find that politically aligned municipalities 
receive 11.4 percent larger grant value than those that are ruled by the opposition.  This effect 
varies widely by application type: we measure 16-19 percent higher grant value per capita in 
the case of those grants where the applicant was a public entity or the outcome of the grant 
involved construction, renovation, infrastructure or public transportation, while for private 
and less visible projects we do not find such effects. 
We also look at channels of political favoritism, and find that not only decision making is 
biased in favor of aligned townships, but also the application process: the success rate is 
larger by 6 percentage points while the application intensity by 6-13 percentage points.  We 
find significant effects only for public and construction grants.  The analysis suggests, 
therefore, that under the scrutiny of the European Commission, politicians manipulate the 
decision-making process to a relatively small extent; rather, they assist aligned applicants to 
submit a larger number of applications and ask for more money. 
Finally, we look at the effect of grants on the electoral gains of city mayors, and we find 
that the large inflow of public and construction moneys may increase the chances of re-
election by 4-5 percentage points, which may be enough to turn around an election. 
These findings have important policy implications.  If visible and public grants are more 
vulnerable to political partisanship, they should perhaps receive special treatment in the EU 
regulation.  More important is that the stringent regulation concerning the decision-making 
process and the scrutiny of spending does not seem to be very effective in the light of our 
results.  In order to mitigate political favoritism and its likely negative effects on income 
inequality and the effectiveness of EU grants, the regulation may also require more 
transparency in this early part of the process with, for example, restricting the possibility of 
personalized calls and very short application deadlines. 
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Table 1 
              Municipality Characteristics by Political Orientation 
 
 
2004  2006  2010 
Aligned 
Not 
Aligned 
 Aligned 
Not 
Aligned 
 Aligned 
Not 
Aligned 
Population 
13.6 6.4 
 
11.6 7.5 
 
7.6 5.9 
(23.8) (17.4)  (25.9) (16.7)  (18.4) (7.4) 
Tax revenue  
per capita 
20.3 13.9 
 
23.1 17.8 
 
21.3 26.7 
(30.3) (21.8)  (39.8) (23.2)  (29.4) (42.4) 
Population 
density 
1.95 1.08 
 
1.84 1.19 
 
1.21 1.83 
(2.45) (1.60)  (2.65) (1.64)  (1.76) (3.14) 
Unemployment 
rate 
10.3 11.8 
 
11.5 11.2 
 
14.7 16.2 
(8.0) (7.7) 
 
(8.5) (8.1) 
 
(8.2) (9.7) 
Total 219 239  166 429  607 96 
Notes: Population measured in thousands, tax revenues measured in thousands of 2012 HUF, density of population 
measured by the number of population per hectare.  Unemployment rate measured by the number of registered 
unemployed over the population 18-59. 
 25 
 
 
Figure 1 
 The Distribution of Grant Value by Year 
 
 
Notes: the bars represent the total value of grants distributed each year in HUF 2012. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Grant Value by Applicant Type and Visibility 
 
 Applicant Type Type of Activity 
 Public Private Construct
ion 
Other 
2004-2006 0.42 0.58 0.55 0.45 
2006-2010 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.54 
2010-2012 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.48 
2004-2012 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 
Notes: N = 7007 municipality-years.  Private = applicant private; Public = 
applicant public organization; Construction = grants in construction and 
renovation of buildings, infrastructure, public transportation vehicles; 
Other = grants not in the construction category. 
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Figure 2 
Yearly Grant Value by Political Alignment 
 
 
Note: N = 7007 township-years.  The size of the bars represent the total value of grants.
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Table 3 
Dependent Variables by Political Cycle 
  
 2004-2006 2006-2010 2010-2012 
Grant Value per Capita 0.030 0.059 0.161 
 (0.059) (0.144) (1.426) 
Applications/Population 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Successful Application/Application 0.509 0.590 0.542 
 (0.233) (0.266) (0.300) 
Grant Value Requested/Successful Application  65.0 95.8 215.2 
 (146.6) (399.7) (1572.4) 
Grant Value Awarded/Grant Value Requested 0.984 0.979 0.985 
 (0.040) (0.059) (0.066) 
Grant Value Requested/Rejected Application  80.1 102.0 74.8 
 (168.3) (374.4) (173.8) 
Notes: N = 7007 township-years.  Grant value measured in Millions of HUF 2012.  
Grant value awarded/grant value requested is measured for successful applications. 
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Table 4 
 The Effect of Political Orientation on Grant Value per Capita 
 
  Applicant Type Activity Type 
 Total Public Private Construction Other 
CROSS SECTION (OLS)     
Aligned 0.092 0.154*** -0.022 0.167*** -0.003 
(0.058) (0.055) (0.046) (0.047) (0.050) 
Tax revenue per capita 0.118*** 0.009 0.162*** -0.024 0.183*** 
(0.041) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) 
Population density 0.047 0.033 0.041 0.044 0.032 
(0.055) (0.046) (0.045) (0.034) (0.046) 
Unemployment rate -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
R2 0.348 0.273 0.345 0.207 0.364 
PANEL (FIXED EFFECTS)     
Aligned 0.114* 0.164*** -0.038 0.194*** -0.018 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.050) (0.058) (0.053) 
R2 (within) 0.177 0.171 0.117 0.132 0.168 
Notes: N = 7007.  Dependent variable: log(yearly total grant value/population).  For 0 grant value the dependent variable replaced 
with 0.  The regressions control for region-year (7 regional categories) and type of settlement (7 categories).   The panel regression 
also includes the variables presented for the OLS regression.  In election years multiple time periods are used and they are weighted 
such that the sum of weights equal 1.  Standard errors (clustered at the regional level) in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1-
percent level; ** = significant at the 5-percent level; * = significant at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 5 
 The Effect of Political Orientation on Grant Value per Capita  
(Alternative Specifications)  
 
  Applicant Type Activity Type 
 Total Public Private Construction Other 
Uncleaned Mayor Variable     
Aligned 0.097 0.179** -0.041 0.194** 0.015 
(0.080) (0.085) (0.061) (0.080) (0.069) 
R2 0.215 0.202 0.151 0.161 0.203 
Political Alignment of City Council    
Aligned 0.233*** 0.286*** 0.063 0.346*** 0.045 
 (0.084) (0.106) (0.081) (0.105) (0.086) 
R2 0.310 0.293 0.239 0.221 0.321 
Tobit regression      
Aligned 0.065 0.151*** -0.052 0.157*** 0.001 
 (0.047) (0.042) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) 
Log Likelihood -11387 -9136 -9023 -5427 -9299 
Discretionary Subprograms     
Aligned 0.128** 0.177*** -0.033 0.194*** 0.001 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.051) (0.058) (0.054) 
R2 0.160 0.150 0.123 0.132 0.163 
Notes: N = 4867 in the first panel, 3192 in the second, 7007 in the third and fourth.  Dependent variable: log(yearly grant 
value/population).  For 0 grant value the dependent variable replaced with 0. The regressions control for log(tax 
revenue/population), log(population density) the unemployment rate, region-year (7 regional categories), and type of settlement (7 
categories).  Municipality fixed-effects removed.  In election years multiple time periods are used and they are weighted such that 
the sum of weights equal 1. In the tobit regressions the numbers represent marginal effects. Standard errors (clustered at the 
regional level) in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1-percent level; ** = significant at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 6 
 The Effect of Political Influence on Application Process and Grant Success 
 
  Applicant Type Activity Type 
 Total Public Private Construction Other 
Applications/Population  
Aligned 0.110 0.132*** -0.022 0.059*** -0.020 
(0.081) (0.034) (0.067) (0.021) (0.078) 
R2 0.069 0.119 0.046 0.123 0.057 
N 7007 7007 7007 7007 7007 
Successful Applications/Total Applications 
Aligned 0.016 0.037** -0.002 0.057** 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) 
R2 0.138 0.179 0.133 0.318 0.168 
N 5321 3976 3970 2260 4214 
Grant Value Requested/Successful Application 
Aligned 0.018 0.063 -0.015 0.171 0.046 
 (0.055) (0.076) (0.056) (0.109) (0.054) 
R2 0.229 0.251 0.184 0.213 0.305 
N 4188 2780 3203 1189 3342 
Grant Value Awarded/Grant Value Requested  
Aligned -0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) 
R2 0.044 0.041 0.051 0.166 0.064 
N 4188 2780 3203 1189 3342 
Note: The regressions control for log(tax revenue/population), log(population density), unemployment rate, region-year (7 
regional categories) and type of settlement (7 categories).   Municipality fixed-effects removed.  In election years multiple 
time periods are used and they are weighted such that the sum of weights equal 1. Standard errors (clustered at the regional 
level) in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1-percent level; ** = significant at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 7 
 The Effect of Grants on Election Outcomes 
 
(1)   (2)   (3)  
Total 0.007**
* 
 Public 0.012***  Construction 0.012*** 
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
   Private -0.000  Other 0.000 
    (0.002)   (0.002) 
R2 0.244   0.249   0.249 
Notes: N = 4746. Dependent variable: change in votes for the incumbent mayor.  The 
regression controls for log(tax revenue/population), log(population density), unemployment 
rate, interactions between time effects and the party affiliation of the mayor and mayors’ 
share of votes in the preceding election.  Standard errors (clustered at the regional level) in 
parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1-percent level. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
 Effect of Mayor Attributes on Grant Distribution 
 
  Applicant Type Activity Type 
 Total Public Private Construction Other 
Aligned 0.126** 0.195*** -0.038 0.200*** -0.002 
(0.060) (0.061) (0.050) (0.057) (0.053) 
Tenure -0.017** -0.029*** -0.014* -0.012 -0.022*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Member of parliament 0.037 -0.081 0.161 0.061 0.024 
(0.116) (0.120) (0.107) (0.135) (0.124) 
Votes between 50-70% -0.030 -0.019 -0.015 -0.013 -0.025 
 (0.085) (0.088) (0.074) (0.085) (0.077) 
Votes between 70-90% -0.095 0.012 -0.176* -0.016 -0.125 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.094) (0.107) (0.098) 
Votes > 90% 
 
0.023 0.087 -0.097 0.050 -0.089 
(0.089) (0.095) (0.077) (0.091) (0.084) 
R2 0.178 0.174 0.119 0.133 0.170 
Notes: N=7007.  Dependent variable: log(grant value/population).  The regressions control for log(tax revenue/population), 
log(population density), unemployment rate, region-year (7 regional categories) and type of settlement (7 categories).   Municipality 
fixed-effects removed.  In election years multiple time periods are used and they are weighted such that the sum of weights equal 1. 
Standard errors (clustered at the regional level) in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1-percent level; ** = significant at the 5-
percent level; * = significant at the 10-percent level. 
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Table A2 
 The Effect of Political Influence on Average Grant Value per Capita  
(Rejected Applications) 
 
  Applicant Type Activity Type 
 Total Public Private Construction Other 
Grant Value Requested/Rejected Application 
Aligned 0.054 0.090 0.045 0.187 0.060 
 (0.057) (0.069) (0.064) (0.118) (0.058) 
R2 0.204 0.255 0.188 0.245 0.267 
N 3857 2368 2901 1085 2926 
Note: The regression controls for log(tax revenue/population), log(population density), unemployment rate, region-year (7 
regional categories) and type of settlement (7 categories).   Municipality fixed-effects removed.  In election years multiple 
time periods are used and they are weighted such that the sum of weights equal 1. Standard errors (clustered at the 
regional level) in parentheses. 
 
 
 
